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Abstract
Measures to reduce material damage within companies may both increase the business economic
performance of the company and trafk safety in general. In this paper the notion of whether such
measures are economically feasible is investigated. Results are presented of a series of interviews
among transport companies and of a postal questionnaire survey. Next, calculations are presented for
three types of companies: a small family company, a large family company and a large formalised
company. The main conclusions are that a successful introduction of measures is largely influenced by
psychological and cultural factors. Especially in larger companies, substantial cost savings may occur
due to an active material damage prevention policy, which will also have positive impacts on traftic
safety in general.
1. Introduction
Damage reduction often receives scant attention from transport companies, despite the possibility
that costs of damage cases are high. It is important to note that a damage case not only results in
direct costs such as those of repair, but also in indirect costs: administration costs, costs for a
temporary replacement of a truck, a negative image for a company, time costs of the driver and
other employees, etc. Transport companies are often unaware of these high indirect costs.
Insurance companies suggest that these indirect costs may on average be as high as the direct
costs. Direct costs, with the exception of the known risk, are covered by the insurance company;
this is not the case, however, for the indirect costs. In addition, companies that have a reduced
damage frequency pay lower premiums than companies with a high frequency. Therefore,
decreasing the number of damage cases may result in large cost cuts, which may be even larger
than is directly shown in the company accounts.
If a company wants to reduce its damage costs it may implement a wide range of measures, but
the introduction of these measures will, however, result in costs for the company. From an
economic point of view, it becomes interesting to evaluate whether the cost savings are higher
than the costs made after introducing the measure.
The costs of high damage rates are not only high for the companies, but also for all of society
because of the connection with traffic  safety. Insurance companies indicate that approximately 2%
of the reported damage cases by transport firms are accidents that have slightly injured people,
1% have heavily wounded people, and 0.25% are fatal accidents. Heyer and Wouters (1996) also
emphasise the societal advantages of fewer accidents; with every truck driver who is injured in an
accident, there are on average, six persons besides the driver who are injured.
It can therefore be assumed that an active damage reduction policy will clearly have positive
impacts on traffic safety in general. As a result, society will benefit from reducing the number of
damage cases; this may be an important reason for governments to stimulate active damage
prevention policies of transport companies.
The high internal economic and external costs of damage cases lead to the question of whether
‘win-win’ situations can occur, whereby companies can make profitable investments in damage
reduction measures and traffic  safety for society overall is improved. To analyse this, our paper
presents some indicative analyses of the costs and benefits from a firm perspective. We are acutely
aware that these measures will lead to reductions of both private and external costs of damage
cases. We decide to focus on the private costs here, in order to discover the extent to which
measures are profitable from a firm’s standpoint. To find the necessary information for these
analyses a variety of interviews were held and a postal questionnaire survey was sent to transport
companies. The results of this empirical research will be discussed first, and afterwards the results
of the calculations will be presented. For a more detailed analysis we refer to Lindeijer et al.
(1997).
2. Results of the Interviews
Based on two interviews with an expert, 21 clearly identified measures have been investigated in
the research. The beginning of the establishing of a damage reduction plan is the introduction of
the so-called ‘start model’. This model consists of three parts:
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l a formalised damage reporting system, with e.g., standardised forms and a fixed person to
whom damage is to be reported;
l a computerised damage registration system, that uses a spreadsheet program or more
sophisticated software;
l individual feedback to the driver (e.g., a short talk and discussion for every damage case).
This model should be introduced before other measures are introduced, because if a company has
no insight into the location of problems and of those who cause high damage rates, it makes no
sense to introduce measures. In addition to this start model, a wide range of measures have been
identified, varying from damage prevention meetings, courses and training activities, sanction and
bonus schemes (material and non-material), ABS-systems etc. (see also Figure 1 for the entire
list).
Interviews with representatives of transport firms  active in taking damage prevention measures
lead to the following conclusions:
1. The start model (formalised damage reporting, computerised registration and individual feed-
back) leads to large damage reduction percentages. Companies mention reductions of up to
50%,  mostly depending on the damage frequency before the model is implemented. The
following reasons for these reductions are:
l the attention to damage prevention makes drivers more conscious about the costs of
damage reduction and the need/necessity to pay attention to this;
l the management of the company gains insight into the damage patterns, frequencies, etc.,
and is therefore better qualified to introduce effective measures;
l because of the measurement activities sometimes individual drivers or cases attract
attention. In one company for instance, 20% of the drivers was involved in 80% of the
damage cases. By giving these drivers particular attention, the damage frequency was
lowered dramatically. In another company, many accidents occurred at a specific crossing;
by undertaking action there, the damage costs were significantly reduced.
2. The introduction of the start model results in a reduction of the number of damages as well as
in lower average costs per damage case. One company reports that not the number of
damages, but only the average amount per damage case was reduced.
3. Additional measures - aside from the start model - are often decided in an ad hoc way rather
than after an analysis of possible benefits, costs and measures. These measures often aim to
maintain the results at the current level by giving new attention to damage prevention. It is
therefore difficult to give exact impacts of these measures.
4. The company’s culture is often more important to the acceptance and introduction of
measures than the monetary costs are. Companies still owned by the founder or his family
(‘family companies’) mostly have an informal style. The management knows or assumes to
know the drivers and is therefore reluctant to take measures which aim to influence a driver’s
manner or could be interpreted as criticism of the drivers. In such companies the director’s
opinion is the most decisive factor of the introduction of a measure. In more formalised
hierarchical companies implementation is easier.
5. In many cases it is not the measure itself, but the psychological impact of a measure which is
regarded as important. For example, a spirit of competition may develop between drivers to
have lowest damage records. Also significant is that a measure be considered as ‘fair’ or
‘reasonable’. Several companies emphasise the importance that a driver (or a small group of
drivers) is responsible for his ‘own’ truck. The perceived attention of the management when
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introducing measures and the publicity around damage reduction is extremely important for the
successful implementation of a measure.
6. The reasons for starting with damage reduction plans are mostly found in the high costs. A
threat of a premium rise by an insurance company is important in this respect, but so is a
comparison of a company’s own damage pattern with the national average, or a chaotic
spiralling of control of damage costs. Some companies also mention image improvement as a
reason for beginning with damage prevention.
7. Technical measures such as ABS-systems, a capsize warning system, and side protection are
in almost all cases considered too expensive when compared with the expected cost reductions.
3. Results of the Postal Questionnaire Survey
To get a broader picture of the damage reduction policies of companies as well as the impacts of
the selected measures, a postal questionnaire survey was sent to about 500 companies in 1997.
The useful response rate was 132 companies (26%). A wide range of companies are included in
the research population, varying from companies having transport as a main activity, to companies
which primarily transport their own goods between plants or to customers. The size of the firms,
the market in which they operate, and the type of goods carried also varies widely. Here we will
present some main conclusions of the questionnaire.
Opinions regarding various measures
In Figure 1, the scores for the introduction of various measures are presented. The costs
of the measures which have to be contracted out - driving skill test, safety course, tachograph
analysis - are perceived to be high, while the first two are also quite difficult to introduce
according to the respondents. The costs of technical measures - ABS, black box, extra side
protection, trip planning - are also thought to be high. Sanctions and rewards (monetary, non-
monetary), maintenance check, and the inclusion of damages as an item in the yearly individual
assessment talk are regarded as relatively inexpensive.
Most measures receive scores between 3 and 4 (on a scale of 1-5, in which 1 is very negative and
5 is very positive: see Figure l), in response to the resistance against any particular measure in the
organisation. The differences between the measures are not very large. The same holds true for
the perceived effectiveness of measures. Most measures get an average score between 3 and 4,
which indicates that they are considered to be quite effective. The main exceptions are sanction-
and reward systems, which are thought to be less effective than the other measures.
The set of measures most often implemented are the start model, extensive training of new
employees by a company’s personnel and a daily maintenance check. Training giving by a
company’s own personnel is considered as rather high, but this measure is nevertheless assumed
to be effective. More than 10% of the companies state that individual feedback, computerised
damage registration, selection of new employees based on their ‘damage history’, damage cases in
the yearly individual assessment talks, and computerised trip planning are being implemented in
1997.
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Note:
Scores for damage prevention measures
Scores  run from 1 to 5; 1 = very high costs, very much resistance, very ineffective, introduction 0%; 5 = very low costs, very little resistance, very ineffective, introduction
100%.
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The costs of these measures are all perceived to be rather low (average score <2),  with the
exception of computerised  trip planning. It must be noted that this measure is not considered as a
damage reduction measure. It is also expected that these measures are relatively easy to introduce
(besides trip planning). It is striking that a great number of companies have adjusted the routing
on their own premises, and notably few companies have introduced sanction and reward schemes.
To analyse the scores in another way, a cost-effectiveness and a resistance-effectiveness index
have been calculated based on the scores given. The cost-effectiveness index for example, is
calculated by dividing the score for the perceived costs by the score for perceived effectiveness.
These figures indicate the extent to which the perceived costs, effectiveness and resistance are
related, and which measures are most attractive from both points of view: the higher the index,
the more attractive is the measure. The scores are presented in Table 1.
Table I Cost-effectiveness- and the resistance-effectiveness indices of damage reduction
measures
Measure cost/ Resistance/ Measure cost/ Resistance/
effectiveness effectiveness effectiveness effectiveness
Form.  damage report 1.39 1.32 Prevention meeting 1.03 1.08
Material sanction 1.37 1.19 Tachogr.  analysis 1.01 1.20
Immaterial sanction 1.33 1.07 Trip planning 0.95 0.99
Immaterial reward 1.28 1.42 Adaption premises 0.94 1.06
Indiv. assessment talk 1.27 1.26 Side protection 0.87 1.09
Damage registration 1.25 1.24 Training new pers. 0.86 1.03
Maintenance check 1.25 1.12 Safety course 0.77 0.91
Individual feedback 1.20 1.14 Driving test 0.75 0.90
Handbook 1.17 1.07 ABS 0.74 1.03
Selection new pers. 1.15 1.14 Black box 0.70 0.89
Material reward 1.06 1.33
Note: A score above 1 indicates that this measure can be implemented at relative low costs/resistance compared to its effectiveness; a score < 1
means the opposite.
It can be concluded from observing the table above that the start model, sanction and reward
schemes, the involvement of damage patterns in individual assessment talks, and maintenance
check receive the highest score on the cost-effectiveness index. Technical measures (ABS, black
box) and measures having to be contracted out (driving test, safety course) receive a low score.
The results of the interviews (Section 2) confirm this finding.
From the resistance-effectiveness index it appears that sanction schemes will yield greater
resistance than reward systems, although the first still score above ‘ 1’ on the index. Technical
measures (except the black box) are also easy to introduce, while measures which are based on
participation of the company’s own sta.K(maintenance  check, feed-back) score relatively low on
this index. The correlation between the cost effectiveness and resistance effectiveness is rather
high (0.74): measures that tend to have a high cost effectiveness also tend to be perceived as
highly resistance effective.
Other results
In addition to the questions related to the measures, some other questions have also been asked
about the opinions of the respondents regarding damage prevention. Approximately 25% of the
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respondents have established a damage reduction plan; most of these plans were written in the
1990s.
On average, the respondents have a positive attitude towards damage reduction policies. Only the
statement ‘damage reduction policies are too time consuming’ is valued in a neutral way, but the
respondents do not believe that ‘it diverts the attention from other tasks’, ‘it has no impact’ or
that ‘their organisation is too small’. Impacts such as ‘lower absence due to illnesses’, ‘lower use
of petrol’ and ‘a better working atmosphere’ are however not supported.
Another question refers to the factors which are most important for a successful introduction of
measures. Most weight appears to be attached to the involvement of the drivers and the
management, followed by a continuous attention to damage reduction in the company. Somewhat
lower - but still high - scores are given to the availability and enthusiasm of the employee
responsible for damage reduction and the quality of the information provided to the drivers. The
lowest scores - but still quite high - are for the support of the insurance company and the
employers organisation.
Subgroup analysis
A subgroup analysis has been conducted to identify differences of opinion and to draw
conclusions regarding the influence of characteristics of companies and damage prevention. The
number of accidents and the relation with various characteristics of the company have been
analysed through a regression analysis. The results are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 Regression anaIysis  with average number of damage cases (per year per truck)
as dependent variable
!hbgroup CC& Subamp CO&
With prevention plan o.503 Bulk freight -0.503
Light freight -0.00
Fixed routes -o.473
Variable routes -0.24 Distribution transport4
Full loads4
Number of trucks 0.00
constant 1.113
Regional orientation 0.10
R2 0.36
Notes: 1) Reference values: with prevention plan, both, iutemationaLhtiona1  orientation, no specialisation,  both.
2) n= 71
3) Significant at 5% level.
4) These variables have not been used in the fd estimation, but were not sig&icant  in other specifications.
From this analysis it can be concluded that companies having a damage reduction plan have on
average, more damage cases than companies without such a plan. Having many damage cases
apparently results in preparing and introducing a plan but such a plan has not (yet) reduced the
amount of cases below the average of all companies. Another effect may be that firms with a
damage reduction plan have as a result a better damage registration and hence they report more
damage cases.
Companies which usually use heavy trucks generally report fewer damages than companies
transporting lighter and perishable goods. This may be explained by the notion that speed is more
important in the second type of goods transport than in the first. On the other hand, distribution
transport does not reveal more damage cases - but the correlation with the lighter goods and this
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variable is high. Another result is that companies which primarily drive fixed routes encounter
fewer damage cases than the companies driving alternate routes. It seems plausible that if a route
is known fewer accidents are likely to happen.
The number of trucks has no significant impact in this multi variate analysis. This is noteworthy,
since during the interviews it was often remarked that companies with many cars, and a more
hierarchical and formal structure with less input from the drivers, often have a greater number of
damage cases per truck. This also appeared from a more qualitative analysis of the data (see
below). Apparently, however, this variable is correlated with other variables in the analysis, so
that it has largely lost its explanatory power.
In Lindeijer et al. (1997) tables are presented on the views of various subgroups regarding the list
of measures. We will only discuss the main conclusions:
l larger companies report more damage cases than smaller companies do;
l larger companies have introduced more measures;
l large companies value various measures differently from small ones; this may be due to cultural
differences or introduction problems.
The above analysis is based on qualitative data concerning perceptions. To give a more precise
indication of the costs and benefits of damage prevention measures, we made a selection of 10
promising measures mainly based on Table 1. In the remainder of the paper these measures will be
discussed and the impacts, costs and benefits will be calculated. Before turning to the actual
calculations, it is first necessary to define in further detail some companies for which these
calculations will be made and give more succint  indication of the impacts of various measures is
given.
4. Company Types
From the interviews and the postal questionnaire it clearly appeared that the internal economic
costs and benefits depend on specific characteristics of a company. It is therefore not possible to
present general calculations applicable to each company. Three general company types are
defined, and are more or less representative for all companies; each differs largely in size and
company culture. To reduce the complexity of the analysis, no further distinction is made about
other characteristics of a company, also because these characteristics are too specific and differ
too much for individual companies. The companies are described as follows.
Company A: Small  Farnib  Company
Company A is a small family company managed by the founder or family of the founder. The
company started with just one truck, and slowly grew; now there are many more drivers and
members of the family work for the company. The company’s culture is therefore very unofficial,
problems are solved informally, and the employees know ‘everything’ about each other (driving
style, driving behaviour, number of damages), but it is ‘not done’ to criticise  colleagues. The
involvement of employees within the company and management is very large. The company has
10 trucks and 10 drivers; more personnel are employed for other tasks. The damage frequency is
quite low and is about 0.5 cases per truck/driver per year.
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Company B: Large Family Company
Company B is a large version of Company A. The founder is the director of the company and also
the informal company culture is still present. The company has however, grown considerably over
time; therefore the social involvement and cohesion are smaller than in Company A. As a result,
the damage frequency is higher. Company B owns 50 trucks and has 50 drivers. The damage
frequency is 0.75 cases per truck/driver per year.
Company C: Large Formalised  Company
Company C has an entirely different company culture: relations among employees are hierarchical
and strongly formalised. Management does not know its employees very well, and there is an
intermediate management level. The commitment of the drivers to the company is small; the same
holds for the social cohesion of the drivers. The damage frequency on the other hand is rather
high. The company owns 100 trucks and employs 100 drivers. The average damage frequency is
higher than in the previous companies: 0.9 per truck per year.
5 . Impacts of the measures
After the definition of the company types we now turn to the impacts - i.e. the level of damage
reduction per measure - of a measure for each company type. Based on a literature review and
supplemented with the results of the various interviews, it is possible to estimate the impacts of
the selected measures per company. We will analyse the maximum effects: in practice, the effects
are probably smaller because of implementation problems or specific features of a company.
The  start model
From the interviews it was revealed that the introduction of the start model may result in a
damage reduction of up to 50%. Furthermore, it appeared that giving individual feedback to the
drivers is the most difficult to introduce, because it costs most time and causes the greatest
resistance. As a consequence, this part of the start model is the least introduced.
Nevertheless, it may be assumed that the start model without the giving of individual feedback
may also have a positive impact on damage reduction (see Chhokar and Walin,  1984). For
pragmatic reasons, it is assumed then that the start model without individual feedback is followed
by a reduction of the number of damages by 25%.
Due to the company culture and the fact that the management knows its personnel, it is however
assumed that this model will have no impact in Company A. So the effects of 50% or 25% only
hold for Companies B and C.
Damage prevention meetings, driving tests and reward/sanction schemes
Gregersen (1995) investigates the impact of behavioural measures on the reduction of damages.
In this research, the largest impact is found for group discussions (54%; this is assumed to be the
maximum impact of damage prevention meetings), followed by driving tests (34%) and reward
schemes (lower, but no percentage is reported). Based on the research of Bruce et al. (1989), the
impact of sanction and reward schemes is assumed to be 25%. The latter schemes should be
adapted to the company’s culture however; otherwise these will not be very effective and merely
cause considerable resistance (Kipping,  1989).
Damage prevention meetings are designed to improve social cohesion, while both other measures
may be assumed to compensate for the lack of commitment or social cohesion. Therefore, these
measures are again assumed to have no impact in Company A, where these factors cause no
problems.
Yearly assessment talks and tachograph analysis
As is the case with the driving tasks, these measures aim to influence and control driving
behaviour. It is assumed then, that the impact of these measures is about as large as the impacts of
the driving tests (34%) when these tests are repeated periodically (yearly). However, in many
cases, these measures may only be introduced incidentally, for instance, after a serious damage
case or accident. The measures acquire the character of a sanction; it is assumed therefore, that
the incidental measures will have the same impact as sanction schemes (25%) do.
Selection personnel, maintenance check, drivers ’ handbook
These measures do not impact at the individual level, but strive to influence the behaviour of the
whole group of drivers. Therefore, there is only a general reduction impact, because the
commitment of drivers increases. This effect will not be very important in practice as was
frequently mentioned in the interviews: the maximum effect is said to be 2%. For a comparable
measure, Twisk (1993) finds a similar effect.
In Company A the management has a good overview on damages per driver and knows their
driving style; these measures are assumed to have no effect in company A. The management may
also be well informed about new drivers in such a company.
We assume that a company in all cases introduces the start model. However, individual feedback
is not introduced by all companies, so we will make calculations for both cases. Next, it is
assumed that one of the other measures is introduced. The other measures therefore have an
additional effect after the introduction of the get-started model.
6. Cost-benefit analysis for the distinct Companies
When calculating the costs of a measure, a distinction has been made between direct and indirect
costs (see Section 1) as well as initial (once-only), fixed (yearly) and variable (depending on the
number of damage cases) costs. Various assumptions have been made, e.g. regarding the time
needed to implement the measure. These assumptions will certainly influence the outcome of the
calculations. The main issues are:
l the method of implementation; what is the time needed to implement the measure, what are the
investment costs (e.g., material), is contracting out or external advice necessary, etc.;
l the availability of resources; for example, can computerised  registration use existing
computers and software?, is there a maintenance unit?;
l to which extent do economies of scale occur? Measures with high fixed investment costs are
more attractive for large rather than for small companies.
To calculate the benefits of the measures assumptions have to be made. Based on information
provided during the interviews, the average cost per damage case is $1,5001,  of which 50% is
repaid by the insurance company. For indirect costs, an amount of $750 per case has been added.
’ The initial calculations were in Dutch guilders. Here an exchange rate of 1 USD = 2 DFL is used.
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It is also assumed that a reduction in damages will be rewarded by the insurance companies by
reducing the premium by 50% of the amount of money saved. In total, the benefit to a company
of one less damage case is therefore $3.375. We will not elaborate here on the specific costs and
benefits of the calculations, but instead present the results (Table 3).
Table 3
Measure
Start model
Benefit-
Company
bst  balance G
A
hmage prevt tion measure. USD  per yea I
B+’ B-’ c+’ c-’
-I-  750 15,594 7,182 81,391 39,493
Sanctions and rewards -l-l86 17,568 20,380 27,393 42,580
Indiv. assessment talk J-80 17,885 20,698 27,895 43,082
Prevention mf&.ings -1-692 26,060 30,279 40,343 63,968
Driving test (incidental) 2,121 12,243 14,353 19,705 29,830
Driving test (periodical) 955 8,235 11,048 10,828 26,015
Tachograph analysis (inc) 2,194 12,206 14,173 19,980 29,329
Tachograph analysis (col) 2,188 13,781 16,594 20,688 35,875
Drivers’ hand book J-185 1,037 1,037 1,225 2,913
Selection Personnel J-32 1,248 1,248 1,371 3,058
Maintenance check J-634 -l-1,765 1,765 -l-4,655 42,967
Notes: 1) B-  and C- have introduced the start model without individual feedback, B+ and C+ have introduced the model including individual
f e e d b a c k .
.2) In the calculations it is assumed that  the measure is the only one which is introduced in addition to the start model.
For Company B and C all measures are economically profitable except ‘maintenance check’. The
latter is caused by the large time costs: it is assumed that it takes two minutes per driver per day.
In practice, however, these costs may not be perceived to be as high as these calculations indicate.
Furthermore, the benefits of the drivers’ hand book and the selection of personnel show the
lowest benefits. For the other measures, the benefits are so high that other assumptions regarding
the costs and benefits/effects will lead to positive results unless the assumptions diier widely.
Table 4 Benefit-Cost  ratio of damage prevention measures (USD per year; maximum
Measure
Start model
eflects)
Company
Sanctions and rewards
Indiv. assessment talk
Prevention meetings
Driving test (incidental)
Driving test (periodical)
Tachograph analysis (inc)
Tachograph analysis (col)
Drivers’ hand book
Selection Personnel
Maintenance check
A
-- 8.86 5.46 28.73 15.78
--
-_
10.49
1.43
15.63
3.19
--
B+’
25.6 29.54 22.15 33.88
46.11 53.20 36.18 55.33
10.41 11.94 8.73 13.26
11.97 13.85 9.83 14.36
1.82 2.10 1.61 2.46
11.58 11.93 11.21 11.73
4.06 4.69 3.59 5.84
3.80 3.80 3.65 7.30
8.87 8.87 5.32 10.65
0.44 0.44 0.27 0.53
B-’ c+’ c-l
Notes: 1) B  and C- have introduced tbe start  model without individual feedback, B+ and C+ have introduced the model including individual
feedback
2) In the caiculations  it is assumed that the measure is the only one which is introduced in addition to the start model.
3) The figures can be intepreted  as follows: a yearly cost of $1  for introducing an individual driving test by company A generates
$10.49 as beneM  (less costs).
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In addition to the balance of costs and benefits, it is also interesting to know what the return on
investment is. This allows for a comparison with other investment possibilities and the yield of
investing in damage reduction. It must be emphasised, however, that the calculations are based on
maximum effects of a measure; in reality the benefits are likely to be smaller. The cost-benefit
ratio is presented in Table 4.
It is important to note, that a combination of various measures will reduce the benefits: now it is
assumed that the measure is the only one in addition to the start model. When more measures are
introduced, the benefits will probably decrease.
From the calculation method it follows that the benefits for Companies B and C which introduced
the start model without individual feedback benefit more from the other measures than the
companies which do introduce individual feedback - the benefits of the start model are of course
lower. This is caused by the larger impact of the full start model; therefore there are fewer
damage cases ‘left’ for the other measures. But when both amounts are added up (i.e. of the
measures and the start model), the total benefit is in all cases larger than with the limited start
model.
For Company A many fewer measures appear to be profitable in an internal-economic sense.
Some measures are assumed to have no impact whatsoever for this measure, and so there are no
benefits included in the calculations. Only driving tests and tachograph analyses have an effect on
the number of damage cases.
We would like to again emphasise that in the calculations maximum effects are assumed.
However, the benefit-cost ratio clearly shows that when the impact is, for example, half as large
(roughly resulting in 50% lower benefits) most measures are still profitable. The results are
therefore quite robust.
Finally, it should be noted that the calculations are exclusively from  a business perspective;
therefore no impacts have been calculated on other road users. From the interviews it appeared
that these accidents seldom occur per company, so that this does not play a role in the decision-
making process of companies. However, these accidents will also be reduced; meaning that the
benefits per measure are even higher.
7 Conclusions
From the viewpoint of costs and benefits damage prevention measures are mainly interesting to
larger companies. Small companies, being the largest group, have a normally informal culture in
which measures are less effective. Especially those measures for which no large investments are
needed, which influence the behaviour of drivers, and need not to be contracted out are perceived
as attractive by the transport companies. This is no surprise because the costs and the risks are
quite low.
Final remarks must be given on the calculations presented above. The impacts of the measures
are largely related to the way they are implemented. An assortment of subjective factors, such as
the company culture and the involvement of the management play an important role in this
respect. The calculations also assume a maximum effect; in practice, the actual effects will
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probably be lower. But whenever the benefit-cost ratios are analysed, it can be concluded that
when the effects are not maximal there will also be high benefits.
The study shows, that companies with an active damage reduction policy can achieve substantial
benefits and operate in a more profitable way. Additional impacts may also be achieved:
l the atmosphere at the company may improve (e.g., more commitment from the drivers, fewer
absences from illness), this may have positive impacts on the functioning of the company as
well;
l the image of a company may improve because there is less bad news about it;
l there may be additional savings in maintenance costs because more careful driving styles are
applied.
In this way positive and self reinforcing impacts may occur, thus resulting in high indirect benefits
of damage prevention policies.
One of the most striking results of this research is that companies seldom register damage cases
systematically; in even fewer cases individual feedback is given to drivers. Only by introducing the
‘start’ model will large benefits for a company result, mainly because of a cultural and
psychological shift  following from attention given to damage prevention, and possibly from giving
solutions for specific cases. When introducing this so-called ‘start’ model, damage reductions of
50% are sometimes mentioned.
An important social benefit is that the number of accidents will reduce; consequently social
benefits may even be larger than internal ones of the firm. This may be an important reason for
governments to stimulate companies to attend to damage reductions, especially by encouraging
the introduction of the get-started model may be an important step.
In conclusion, high benefits can be achieved especially in larger companies by implementing active
damage reduction strategies. This may also result in an improvement of general traffic  safety.
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